IN his acceptance speech on his re-election as Afghan president on Wednesday, Hamid Karzai vowed to clean up the "dark stain of corruption".
US President Barack Obama responded by saying that this promise of reform will be judged in "deeds" not "words".
If we are to believe "senior palace insiders", some of the proof that Obama requires are the appointment of "reform-minded ministers" and several high-profile scalps, including that of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Afghan president's half-brother, an influential power-broker with reputed links to the drug trade and the CIA.
We are also led to believe that without such evidence in six months, American troops will pull out.
The idea that wagging a stern finger instead of reiterating continuing support will make a difference this time is intriguing.
As refreshing as it may be to hear Obama send such a strong unequivocal message -- assuming that such an ultimatum was delivered and that this was no idle threat -- the notion that somehow this will finally pressure Karzai to crack down on corruption and to form a stable, responsible and accountable government is flawed.
The fact of the matter is that Karzai has had ample time since assuming the interim presidency some eight years ago and his resounding victory in Afghanistan's first-ever presidential election in October 2004 to remove the baneful influence of the warlords and purge his administration of corrupt characters, including those with ties to the trade in opium.
Since those halcyon days of high hopes and eager expectations, things have taken a decided turn for the worse, from streets strafed and scarred with bullets and bombs to elections sullied and stained by vote-fixing and ballot-stuffing.
It is hard to see how a president who was not up to the job in the past, when he was a promising and convincing candidate, could now deliver on his promises when his mandate has been weakened by a low voter turnout and his legitimacy tarnished by a high rate of rejected votes.
In the circumstances, since Karzai's presidency has been damaged and discredited, he should also no longer be viewed as a credible partner to Washington and the West.
But such is the reality of the regional, ethnic and tribal divisions, the patterns of corruption, and the culture of impunity that there has been no really credible leader to head an effective and representative government. As the flawed presidential elections demonstrated, democratic values have not taken root.
This is the fundamental problem for nation-building in Afghanistan.