THE tragic loss of the Indonesian submarine KRI Nanggala-402, which took the lives of 53 people on board, will reverberate throughout the military community for years to come.
A routine naval exercise ended in catastrophe and the loss of not only a prized asset, but also the collective experience of the underwater specialists who spent years honing their knowledge and skills.
Reportedly losing contact one hour after descending underwater, the submarine aimed to conduct a torpedo training exercise off the Bali coast. The tragedy, based on an analysis by the Indonesian Armed Forces, was likely caused by natural issues rather than human or technical error.
In light of this tragedy, many writers have expressed concern about various aspects. This write-up intends to draw attention to the utility of military assets. These assets are expensive and highly advanced at the time of their production. They are constructed to withstand the frictions of weather and combat.
A country's ability to sustain military operations and deliver weapons of mass destruction depends on the quality of its military assets. With this in mind, the durability of these assets in risky situations is paramount. Even when performing under harsh conditions for extended periods, a good asset should not see its hull integrity become compromised.
The stability and sustainability of assets like submarines depend on their ability to operate under excessive pressure, whether when under attack by enemy vessels or diving deep to escape. Hence, periodic maintenance is vital, despite the high cost of operations this entails. There can be no compromise on safety standards.
Though the survivability of the submarine will depend in part on the expertise of the crew to outmanoeuvre the enemy, the crew first needs a safe platform to conduct their business and stay alive. When military assets are lost with such a large crew, it is not just a loss of assets, but also skills and expertise.
Military assets readiness is a combination of man machine interface, where man provides the competency to direct the assets. Much emphasis has been placed on software such as target acquisition and weapon delivery. However, for submarines, as in surface ships, the basic importance of the hull has not changed.
Without a formidable hull to conduct operations, there is no point in investing in software. This German-built Type 209 diesel-electric attack submarine was constructed in 1978 and delivered to Indonesia three years later. It was almost 40 years old. Servicing of vessels is of utmost priority for any maritime nation.
Although the submarine was overhauled in South Korea in 2009 and 2012, it was reported that the structure of the ship was only partially replaced and the structure of other parts of the submarine was questionable. Hence, equal emphasis must be placed on the upgrading of hardware as on software and technology. The government needs to reduce bureaucracy to speed up the fixing or replacement of ageing ships and support effective budgetary planning for continuous efficiency at sea.
Furthermore, basic rescue equipment like orange vests can only be used for recovery and salvaging purposes. Safety nets for crews in distress are vital, yet the Type 209 in Indonesia does not come with a rescue pod.
Drawing an example from India, all of its four HDW Type 209 submarines have detachable rescue pods that can accommodate more than 50 crew members during an emergency. This feature is essential considering the risks the crew may face underwater.
Many other submarine incidents have occurred. The loss of the Russian nuclear-powered submarine K-141 Kursk was another tragic incident. Diesel-electric submarines have also been lost or had issues. However, the sinking of KRI Nanggala-402 is one of the most striking incidents in the history of submarine tragedies.
This is in no small part because this incident speaks so clearly to the significance of the basic safety aspects of submarines.
The writer is a senior lecturer at the Department of Strategic Studies and a Centre of Defence and International Security Studies research fellow at Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the New Straits Times