THE Joe Biden administration's aggressive courtship of Asia-Pacific continued with a flurry of United States diplomatic activity last month.
This included a summit between the US and Asean, Biden's visit to South Korea and Japan, and the Quad meeting.
Importantly, US policies and initiatives in this regard served to ameliorate and cover some of the shortfalls created by the Donald Trump administration, especially in Southeast Asia.
To begin with, the special US-Asean Summit first proposed by Trump had been postponed several times, not least due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
Trump originally suggested the meeting to mitigate the fallout from sending then commerce secretary Wilbur Ross and national security adviser Robert O'Brien to represent the US at Asean meetings in 2020, where they were snubbed by Asean leaders.
Biden's two-day US-Asean Summit, hosted by the US in its capital for the first time, produced symbolic achievements that could be said to have repaired the damage. Three stand out.
First, Biden nominated Yohannes Abraham, chief of staff to the US National Security Council, as the US ambassador to Asean, a position left vacant by the Trump administration.
Abraham was a top aide during the Obama administration, further acting as the executive director of Biden's transition team after the 2020 presidential election.
Such pedigree serves to demonstrate the Biden administration's commitment to Asean.
Second, Biden announced an agreement to establish an Asean-US comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP).
It remains to be seen what this means for US-Asean relations beyond Washington attempting to match Beijing's decision to upgrade its relationship with Asean to CSP status last year.
Nonetheless, at the very least, the Asean-US CSP is another step forward in the US courtship of the region.
This is especially in terms of reassuring regional partners that the US remains focused on the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia despite the Ukraine war.
This further illustrates its determination to uphold the US-led regional order in the face of challenges from Russia and China. The Quad meeting likewise added to this US depiction.
Another key test for the administration will come in November when the CSP is supposed to be ratified at the Asean summit in Phnom Penh.
Regional expectations are that Biden will be in attendance to sign the agreement.
A snub by the president then, whether due to the Ukraine war or other crises, is unlikely to go down well with Asean and rehash the perceived insult from the last time the US attended the Asean meetings physically.
In addition, Cambodia was last Asean chair in 2012, and the ignominy of the 45th Asean Foreign Ministers Meeting failing to issue a joint communique, the first and only time such a thing happened, continues to plague Asean.
Nevertheless, Asean leaders will be looking forward to the Phnom Penh summit as an opportunity to secure one-on-one talks with Biden after being handed off to the vice- president, cabinet officials and congressional leaders in Washington.
Third, Biden made a pledge of US$150 million to bolster greater cooperation between the US and Asean on issues ranging from infrastructure to digital financial services and climate change.
The administration still has much work to do given that this US$150 million pledge amounts to little more than US$0.25 per capita, or one-tenth of what China pledged in development assistance to Asean states last November.
As Biden once famously tweeted: "Don't tell me what you value. Show me your budget, and I'll tell you what you value."
Crucially, however, this aid was bolstered with the introduction of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (Ipef), which the US launched during Biden's trip to Tokyo.
This papers over the economic gap the US created for itself in the region with its withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017.
Ipef is supposed to comprise four pillars or modules — digital trade and trade facilitation, clean energy and decarbonisation, supply chain resilience, and anti-corruption and taxes — but will not offer market access in return for compliance.
This lack has been the principal criticism of Ipef.
However, the Biden administration had long signalled that its economic engagement with the Asia-Pacific would not take the form of a traditional free trade agreement (FTA), replete with lowered tariffs and increased market access, to manage regional expectations.
The Biden administration had also stated that the US would not return to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the TPP's successor, though regional states may view this as the gold standard for fostering deeper economic ties in the region, and however much Asian leaders from Lee Hsien Loong to Fumio Kishida and Jacinda Ardern might wish.
US Trade Representative Katherine Tai has called FTAs "very 20th-century" tools.
During the March congressional hearings, Tai said these FTAs had led to a "considerable backlash" from the American people.
It is unlikely that these attitudes will change anytime soon regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans are in power. There is no appetite in either party to promote free trade.
It is, therefore, unsurprising that the Biden administration's approach to trade matters is guided by its Foreign Policy for the Middle Class, which it hopes will allow Americans to see greater benefits from US trade and diplomacy.
Ipef thus needs to be viewed through a political or geopolitical lens as well, rather than purely economic.
In this manner, it is a pragmatic means to keep the US economically engaged in the region at a level that comports with the US domestic political realities.
From the perspective of regional states, some economic engagement from the US is surely much preferable to none.
Not only that, Asia-Pacific states are also in better shape than previously, having built a denser network of regional economic ties since the US withdrawal from the TPP, making them less reliant on the US for trade.
This has two implications with regard to Ipef. Reduced dependence on the US for trade means that the open architecture of Ipef works to the advantage of regional states: partners can sign up a la carte to modules that best fit their economic needs.
Additionally, denser regional economic ties buffers Asia-Pacific states from fears that Ipef may not survive the Biden administration. By and large, Ipef is, therefore, relatively cost-free for regional states.
Overall, although the Trump administration did not withdraw from the Asia-Pacific, Southeast Asia nor multilateralism, the Biden administration is much more engaged.
Regardless, the question remains whether regional states are convinced of US commitment to the region this time round. Even so, fixing the gaps the Trump administration left has to be a great start.
The writers are research fellows at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore