On Feb 24 last year, Russian forces invaded Ukraine. It was expected to be a "quick" operation to seize the remaining parts of the breakaway regions of Luhansk and Donetsk and install a new regime in Kyiv.
Twelve months later, the "special military operation", as its perpetrators call it, seems no closer to its objectives of "denazification" or "demilitarisation".
As the effects of the conflict continue to reverberate around the globe, there are important lessons for Malaysia in the defence and strategic spheres.
First, the future or lack thereof of Russian military equipment for Malaysia. We did not buy a lot of Russian arms but some of our most important assets are, or have been, Russian.
Currently, they encompass the Su-30MKMs, a significant part of the air force's strike capability as well as third generation anti-armour weapon systems.
Depending on who you believe, Russian arms have come under criticism for their performance, or lack of it, on the battlefield.
Our experiences with the Su-30s and MiG-29s, the latter which are now in storage, also leave much to be desired when it comes to reliability and maintenance, repair and overhaul-contract processes.
Additionally, the sanctions against Russia, even via older mechanisms, like the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, are a significant impediment to Malaysia buying anything major from Russia in the foreseeable future.
It also adds real uncertainty to supply chain concerns — how are we going to service and upgrade the Su-30s?
Currently, major servicing is done in Russia or parts are shipped from there. Is this still possible?
Can Russia even produce the parts we need? Malaysia is currently looking at options like India, but questions on major servicing and upgrades have yet to be answered.
While some might be relieved that the Russian route for arms seems increasing unviable for Malaysia, the prospective cut-off from Russian options could also present certain limitations for us.
For better or worse, the option to buy Russian has allowed Malaysia to match the capabilities of other countries in the region that are more reliable and robust allies of the West.
Russian equipment is also somewhat more affordable (a point disputed by some in the industry) and could be paid for by commodity counter-trade, an important factor for Malaysia.
Second, the demonstration of resolve against a more powerful actor goes a long way in convincing others that you are worth supporting. Ukraine's determination in holding out and blunting the first wave of Russia's attacks changed attitudes in Washington and, grudgingly, in several European capitals as well.
More powerful systems, like long-range artillery and rocket systems, heavier armour and advanced munitions came later.
The Ukrainians have demonstrated the will to fight, which convinced other countries to send more military assistance to not just defend against Russia but to reclaim territory.
This is important for Malaysia as it comes under increasing pressure in the South China Sea from other claimants, chiefly China. Oil and gas operations are now targets for harassment, which local policymakers seem keen to downplay because of the lack of options to effectively respond.
It is telling that Malaysians find out about these pressures chiefly from foreign publications rather than our policymakers.
How Malaysia chooses to react will influence perceptions of the rest of the world, which are closely watching.
While Malaysia has always prioritised closed-door negotiations with China on the dispute, there is growing divergence in the international community on whether Putrajaya is serious about advocating for its rights.
If we are not prepared to advocate for ourselves, it is logical to expect support from others when we need it?
The two lessons above aren't news for operators and practitioners in their relevant fields. Some have long warned of them and their consequences if not addressed.
Hopefully, this war would bury the foolish sentiment that armed conflict and full-scale war between nations are a thing of an "uncivilised" past or unlikely just because one party doesn't desire it.
The challenge here is not whether Malaysia is aware of the lessons, it is whether we are capable of learning from them. The record is mixed on that score.
More worryingly, is the risk of learning the wrong lessons and carrying on with policies and thinking that will continue to limit our options at a time of conflict and flux.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia