ASEAN is living through an existential crisis; its only certainty is that of uncertainty.
The challenges include a risk of conflict between China and the United States, the increasing adoption of Indo-Pacific strategies, and the South China Sea dispute.
These challenges have long beset this region and hamstrung Asean's desire for centrality.
With words like de-risking and friend-shoring used more frequently among its dialogue partners, the growing risk of superpower rivalry hindering investment and trade adds a burden on the organisation.
The more cynical observers would argue that the security and strategic options of Southeast Asia are limited to what the major powers have allowed.
Thus, superpower influence in Asean through member states is neither new nor surprising.
Rather, it is something that most practical governments accept as a fait accompli. They seek to carve a niche so leverage can be maximised for national interest.
Commitments to the spirit of democracy and accountability remain precarious and subject to the interpretations and whims of member states.
Look no further than Asean's fractured, uncertain response to the 2021 coup in Myanmar and the bloody and ruthless crackdown that followed.
These issues and more will be discussed at the Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur from Aug 8 to 10.
Now in its 36th edition and recognised as one of the region's key Track 2 strategic security-focused conferences, the event returns for the first time since 2019 as an in-person conference.
Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim is expected to deliver his first foreign policy-focused speech.
The long-term relational networks built and passed on by those in Track 2 gatherings, including officials and policymakers, who participate in a private capacity, have aided official efforts to facilitate dialogue and manage tensions in the Asia Pacific.
Whether it remains so depends on the determination and creativity of the participants and the openness and commitment of official actors.
Having these discussions in Malaysia is also important as these dynamics will have a severe impact on the nation.
Our geographical position in the centre of Southeast Asia, straddling the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, means we are dependent on global supply chains for prosperity.
This, in turn, ties our strategic risks and options to geostrategic developments in the region and beyond.
The stakes for Malaysia go beyond just national interests.
In 2025, Malaysia will assume the Asean chair.
It will not be a run-of-the-mill year for the organisation as it marks the culmination of Asean's Vision 2025 and the beginning of the post-2025 vision.
Incidentally, the former was agreed on during the last Malay-sian chairmanship a decade ago.
On the latter, a 20-year period has been set, with a midpoint review.
There is an expectation from Asean and dialogue partners for the vision to have goals and flexible implementation mechanisms.
Issues include narrowing the development gap in Asean, sustainable models of growth, and addressing current and anticipated challenges and trends in and beyond Southeast Asia.
Malaysia has assumed the responsibility of being a permanent co-chair of the high-level task force shaping the post-2025 vision.
We are also expected to develop a plan to strengthen Asean's capacity and institutional effectiveness, always a contentious subject and one of the association's great paradoxes.
Member states have longed recognised that the regional organisation needs better cohesion and resources, but are loath to allow any development that might impinge on national interests.
Malaysia is thus entrusted with significant responsibilities, much like it was when the Asean Community was declared at the 2015 summit in Kuala Lumpur.
More inclusive and incisive conversations across a broad spectrum of policy observers and practitioners will play a crucial supporting role over the next two years and beyond.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic & International Studies (Isis) Malaysia