A peaceful, stable and resilient region is the lifeblood of Asean Community Vision 2025, which is built upon three pillars: Political-Security Community, Economic Community and Socio-Cultural Community.
To implement this vision, the bloc strives to maintain peace and stability, integrate markets and build a community with enhanced capacity and capability to respond effectively to challenges and seize opportunities.
China's Global Security Initiative (GSI) – underpinned by six commitments including respecting territorial integrity of all countries, abiding by the principles of the UN Charter and peacefully resolving differences through dialogue – is believed to challenge the US-led security; it fits well with Asean's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that embodies universal principles of peaceful coexistence and calls for mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference and settlement of disputes peacefully.
There is another striking similarity between the GSI, which seeks to build partnerships based on mutual trust, inclusiveness and win-win cooperation and consolidate the political foundation for regional peace and Asean's vision that aspires to collaborate and cooperate with like-minded partners to promote stability in the region.
The South China Sea (SCS) is perhaps the only major source of friction between Asean and China, making the strategic waterways a regional flashpoint and shoving it to a great power competition between China and the US.
But the Southeast Asian states do not want to drag themselves in such a situation where they have to choose between the two economic and military heavyweights.
Then there is the Declaration of Conduct on the SCS that stipulates all parties to resolve their disputes by peaceful means.
However, it doesn't mean China and Asean should not expedite the process of completing the Code of Conduct, which is crucial to prevent the region from sliding into instability as evidenced by the recent Beijing-Manila stand-offs in the SCS.
This is also vital for China given Asean in 2021 agreed to elevate their relationship with China to comprehensive strategic partnership and looked to strengthen their ties.
2023 was a milestone year for the China-Asean relationship since nearly all leaders of the bloc had visited Beijing with those Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaysia landing in China.
During Chinese President Xi Jinping's trip to Vietnam, leaders of the two countries announced to establish a strategic China-Vietnam community of "shared future," indicating a region-wide consensus to safeguard regional stability and boost trade.
Asean's approach is further reflected in its economic relations with China. According to the Asean Secretariat, trade between China and Asean since 2010 had doubled to US$507.9 billion by 2019 and quadrupled since the entry into force of China-Asean Trade in Goods Agreement in 2005.
While China and Asean are strong supporters of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), this economic relationship has been bolstered by the Asean-China Free Trade Agreement, pushing bilateral trade per Asean statistics to US$702 billion in 2023 and posting a robust 10.5 per cent growth in first half of 2024, according to Chinese data.
China has been Asean's largest trading partner since 2009; Asean has become China's for three consecutive years.
Unlike the US that practices selective engagement by prioritizing countries often seen as strategically important in containing China, Beijing pursues a policy of peaceful coexistence, mutually beneficial cooperation and shared growth is viewed in Asean as an effort to build a closer China-Asean community with a shared future and enhance "regional peace, security and prosperity" including through upholding the principles of the UN and Asean Charter.
This affinity is also reflected in the people, academics and researchers of the Asean countries who consider China as an invaluable ally, thanks to their strong trade ties with Beijing, growing people-to-people exchanges and benefits brought about by the projects of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) such as the China-Laos Railway, Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway and Malaysia's East Coast Rail that promote regional integration and serve as a catalyst of growth for regional economies and domestic tourism and industry.
Asean is seeking a greater US role in the region but not at the cost of regional stability and its relations with China. While Asean Outlook of the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) strives to promote inclusiveness rather than rivalry in the region, the alliance is committed to reinforce their comprehensive strategic partnership with Beijing.
China is being helped by the US-led minilateral alliances such as the Squad – a refined version of the Quad, leaving out India and signing on the Philippines alongside Australia, Japan and the US – the JAPHUS, a trilateral grouping of Japan, Philippine and the US and the AUKUS, an Australia-UK-US nuclear alliance that all enfeeble the AOIP relevance by challenging its very principles.
What's more, the Asean Economic Community Blueprint 2025 envisages building a highly cohesive, integrated and resilient economy.
In the coming years, these security architectures as well as the West's ambivalent attitude toward Asean, possible return of Donald Trump and labelling of China as "greatest strategic challenge" will likely widen the gap between Asean and the US, accelerating the trend of a robust Asean-China relationship.
The bloc's view of China radically varies from the West, which interprets the BRI as an emblem of its expansion strategy. Most Southeast Asian nations don't see Beijing as expansionist or a military threat and aspire to benefit from the world's second largest economy.
This fundamental asymmetry in the respective approaches will continue to dominate the regional geopolitics and to the dislike of the US, will cement China's position as a Asean's comprehensive strategic partner.
* The writer is a geopolitical analyst with a keen interest in the economy, climate change and regional conflicts