WITH the inauguration of Prabowo Subianto as Indonesia's new president, much attention will be focused on whether the shift of country's capital from Jakarta to Nusantara in East Kalimantan will be pursued with the same vigour as his predecessor, Joko Widodo.
Moving to Nusantara has probably achieved sufficient momentum in some aspects, but there is much inertia in others — not least from the thousands of bureaucrats who will have to move — that can slow down if not altogether scupper the shift, especially if Prabowo decides to stay in Jakarta for now and prioritise his agenda.
Nevertheless, the sense of anticipation is palpable, not just in the Indonesian side of Borneo but also in Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak, which together share the island.
There can be no better way to put the island on the global map than to have it host the capital of the region's largest country.
There has been much debate over how the non-Indonesian parts of Borneo can hop on to the Nusantara bandwagon and profit from it.
A lot of it, unfortunately, is rather misplaced. Most initiatives will have to originate from the Indonesian side if they are to prosper.
Enthusiastic business people in Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei and policymakers backing them must be conscious of Indonesian sensitivity to the fact that Kalimantan is perceived as something of a backwater vis-à-vis its neighbours to the north.
Indonesian officials are, therefore, likely to want to be seen as taking the lead in any pan-Borneo economic integration.
It is this largely unspoken imperative that animates policies on and opposition to, making pan-Borneo economic activities as "borderless" as possible.
Despite pandemic-era measures largely irrelevant today, flights between Kuching and Pontianak in West Kalimantan remain suspended, primarily because there is a perception — especially in Jakarta — that the route disproportionately benefits Sarawak as it brings in more Indonesian tourists (including medical ones) than Malaysian tourists going the other way.
The same explains the failure of the Tebedu inland port meant to transport goods by land across the border.
Indonesian officials will probably not budge until there is data showing a semblance of two-way flows of goods between Sarawak and West Kalimantan.
Proposals of rail and road links originating from Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak are likely to meet the same fate unless Indonesian officials can be convinced that these will not disproportionately benefit only Kalimantan's northern neighbours.
It is no accident that Indonesia has invested in building a new deep-sea port in Singkawang, right over the border from Sarawak.
It is an obvious manifestation of Indonesia's desire not to be sidelined by any geographical advantages northern Borneo may have to the main shipping lanes of the South China Sea.
What then must Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei do to convince Indonesia that open borders will be beneficial to all?
Perhaps the realisation of the Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA) offers some clues.
Former Thai prime minister Anand Panyarachun noted in his biography that AFTA was in fact a Singapore initiative although the island republic was astute enough to work hard not to show its hand, such as having Thailand convene the first Asean meeting on AFTA.
This is primarily to get around likely Indonesian antipathies towards AFTA, especially if it were seen as a Singapore initiative.
In Borneo, there is the largely moribund Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines-East Asean Growth Area, or BIMP-EAGA (a sub-Asean grouping).
Much more intense and coordinated lobbying by the three north Borneo states with Kalimantan may be needed to realise beneficial economic impacts from the Nusantara shift.
*The writer views developments in the nation, region and wider world from his vantage point in Kuching
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the New Straits Times