The Sulu Zone — Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea — (after James Warren) borders three countries: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
The recent spike in maritime violence in the Sulu Sea is a result of the tough enforcement policies by the Philippine government under President Rodrigo Duterte to wipe out terrorist activities in the southern part of the republic. It is also partly due to the failure of all three states in enforcing law and order at sea, separately within their maritime space, and jointly in areas outside national jurisdiction.
More glaringly, it is the absence of effective coordination by the three neighbouring states in intelligence/information sharing, surveillance, detection and enforcement, both at sea and in the airspace over it, which makes criminal activities at sea rampant.
More significantly, the exodus of people from the Sulu Zone is a manifestation of the failure of the Philippine government to provide jobs and other forms of economic security.
The establishment of the Eastern Sabah Security Command has not resolved the problems of maritime banditry and illegal entries. While this speaks volumes of the efficacy of the institution in managing maritime predations, the security problems in Sabah waters are made complicated by the porosity of the state’s borders.
Manila’s unsettled and long-standing claim to Sabah, and the presence of illegal immigrants as well as fifth columnists in the state with family connections in the Sulu Zone, have added to the security challenge.
Combined with a lack of respect for cultural and religious identity, poverty has forced many to flee their “homeland” in search of better economic and cultural opportunities. Some, like the sea gypsies, have turned to crime for survival and sanity. This poses a real challenge to those seeking a governance system to manage maritime violence and depredations in the Sulu Zone.
Apart from ransom money and the cost to governments for policing and maintaining security surveillance on a 24/7 basis, the overall economic cost to the three states must be very high.
Adversely affected by the maritime violence and its consequent insecure environment are small-time traders and coastal communities, whose livelihoods depend mainly on the sea. Fishermen, for example, dare not go out to sea for fear of being kidnapped and can ill-afford to install modern electronic devices on their boats.
Many local innocent bystanders are caught in the crossfire between government forces, and sea-robbers, criminals, kidnappers and ransom-takers.
The leaders of all three states have agreed to jointly address the menace. Duterte, for example, has been magnanimous. He gave permission last month for Indonesia to conduct hot pursuits — referring to the rules of engagement for naval forces to enter areas under the national jurisdiction of another state — against criminals at sea, in areas of “their common concern”. Earlier, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak and Indonesian President Joko Widodo had agreed to work together to stamp out the menace.
The defence ministers of the three states met on the sidelines of the Asean-United States defence ministers’ informal gathering in Hawaii, held from Thursday to Saturday, to further ventilate the challenges posed by maritime violence in the Sulu Zone.
Hopefully, something tangible will come out, after being long overdue, of this meeting. While politicians may steal the limelight, credit for this initiative must go to security forces, enforcement agencies, non-governmental organisations and maritime industries, including shipping lines and shippers, as well as those from tourism industries. Their businesses have been badly affected by the maritime menace.
The three states have yet to agree on a joint or coordinated enforcement mechanism and machinery, or architecture for regional cooperation in the Sulu Zone.
The planners can emulate the successful principles applied in existing regional mechanisms in the Straits of Malacca, as well as the United Nations-sanctioned Task Forces (2008) combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. In both cases, incidents of maritime violence over time were reported to have declined substantially after coordinated enforcement mechanisms were set up.
A hybrid inter-government enforcement coordination centre should be established with immediate effect in the Sulu Zone.
This mechanism should emulate best practices from the management experiences in the Straits of Malacca and off the Somali coast. What they need to do is define a common operational area for joint enforcement activities. The naval bases in Tarakan (Indonesia), Zamboanga (the Philippines) and Tawau (Malaysia) are ideal national focal points for the proposed inter-government enforcement coordination organisation.
A revolving joint commander can be appointed and operate from the national focal point to minimise cost. Each participating state must be willing to deploy the necessary assets and resources to undertake the mission. The rules of engagement must be spelt out clearly to avoid future misunderstandings. The devil is always in the details, and can be ironed out only with the respective naval commands and political masters.
While the joint commander should come from the navy, the involvement of other enforcement agencies, for example, the coast guard and air force, is critical.
Lawlessness in the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea is not new. It is has been happening for as long as one can remember, dating back to 1521, when the Spaniards colonised and Christianised the Philippines. Local Muslims and the natives waged a war of insurrection against the colonisers and in the Sulu Zone for taking their land and interfering in their way of life.
Slavery, human trafficking, people smuggling, piracy, sea robberies and kidnappings for ransom were present in the Sulu Zone long before the Spanish colonised the area. Such practices continued when the US was in control of the Philippines (from 1898 onwards), up until the present-day regime. Between the Spanish rule and US colonial administration, there were other maritime powers in the Sulu Zone (including the British and Portuguese) whose Christian values were always at odds with local Muslims.
To keep piracy at bay in the Sulu Zone, it is important for Malaysia, for example, to enact legislation that is in line with international practices.
The three states must temporarily set aside disagreements over maritime boundaries and not be pedantic when it comes to definitions of piracy. They should stay focused on destroying the menace at sea and removing any sanctuary that criminals may have access to on land.
B.A. Hamzah is a student of regional
geopolitics and commentator on maritime security