Nuclear weapons remain the most dangerous, with the potential to kill millions and inflict massive damage. After the termination of the Cold War, it was widely presumed that nuclear weapons were becoming less significant. There were high-level attempts to move towards a global zero and the disbandment of nuclear weapons altogether. However, the global zero and disarmament approaches underappreciated the continuing importance attached to nuclear weapons by Russia and others.
After the break-up of the Soviet Union and its rapidly diminishing economic strength, Russia saw nuclear weapons as the lynchpin of its security and passport to great power status. Hence, despite agreeing to arms limitations with the United States, Russia continued to maintain a large nuclear arsenal and emphasised nuclear weapons in its security strategy. In Asia, China, India and Pakistan viewed nuclear weapons as essential to their security, with India and Pakistan declaring themselves nuclear weapons states in the 1990s.
Now, with Donald Trump in the White House, the US has begun to re-emphasise nuclear weapons. Recently, the Pentagon urged the White House to consider expanded nuclear options, including the development of a “tailored nuclear option for limited use”.
The contemporary nuclear order, however, is not in sync with reality and no longer tenable. It appears likely that more states will join the nuclear club. It is widely believed that Israel has a powerful nuclear weapons capability (equivalent to that of China). India and Pakistan are now declared nuclear weapons states, developing delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads. This brings the number of such states to eight.
Despite wide-ranging sanctions, North Korea is already a nuclear weapons state, or close to becoming one. The international nuclear deal concluded by the Obama administration and others may temporarily slow nuclear weapons development by Iran, but it will likely be the 10th nuclear weapons state in the world. The possible repeal of the Iran nuclear deal by the Trump administration and growing animosity between the US and Iran may hasten the development of Iran’s nuclear weapons capability. At the same time, there are virtual nuclear weapons states that have the technological know-how and plutonium base to go nuclear in a short time. Japan and South Korea are among those in this category.
Experience over the last six decades demonstrates that security is the overarching driver of nuclear weapons programmes. Other so-called drivers, like international prestige, are secondary. When security is the primary driver, countries and regimes are willing to pay a high price to develop their nuclear weapons capability. India and Pakistan paid a very high price, as North Korea is doing. The nuclear club is likely to number in the teens in the near to mid-term future.
The growing significance of nuclear weapons in national security strategies implies that the nuclear strategy will become important again, although in a different strategic context. Countries, like China and India, have begun to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons systems. China is testing Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle systems, while India is perfecting its intercontinental ballistic missile and ballistic missile defence capabilities. At the same time, extended nuclear deterrence will become more significant. The US will have to develop an effective extended nuclear deterrence system for Japan and South Korea if the related alliances are to hold and the nuclear ambitions of these countries kept in check. Nuclear strategies will command greater attention in the years to come.
States will continue to acquire nuclear weapons capability if they perceive a threat and view nuclear weapons as necessary to deal with the threat. Reducing the significance of nuclear weapons requires addressing the underlying political disputes that give rise to such threats.
All arms, including nuclear weapons, are symptomatic of conflict. Although they may, at times, exacerbate certain conflicts, nuclear weapons are not the cause of such conflicts. It is important to address the causes rather than the symptoms. The problem in the Korean peninsula is not the nuclear threat perceived to emanate from North Korea. The Korean problem existed before the development of the North’s nuclear weapons capability. Making “rolling back the nuclear weapons capability of North Korea” the first order of priority is to confuse cause and symptom.
In moving towards sustainable peace in the Korean peninsula, it is important to address the political problem at the heart of the dispute. Addressing the issue will greatly reduce the significance of nuclear weapons.
The nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which forms the lynchpin of the contemporary nuclear order, is outdated. The double standard in the treaty is no longer acceptable. And, disarmament is no longer a realistic goal. “Proliferation” has acquired a negative connotation. The focus should be on slowing the spread of nuclear weapons among states. More importantly, the focus should shift to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to non-state actors, like terrorist groups. They pose a far greater danger to the security of certain countries and the state-centric system than states with nuclear weapons.
The purpose of NPT must shift accordingly, from preventing the spread of nuclear weapons among states to settling or resolving the underlying political disputes among them and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons capability to non-state actors, as well as encouraging nuclear safety and supporting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. To persist with the contemporary formal nuclear order is detrimental to states’ national and international security. A “new” nuclear order, based on present and anticipated realities and problems, should be the goal.
Datuk Dr Muthiah Alagappa is visiting professor at the Asia-Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya. Concurrently, he is
distinguished scholar in residence
at American University and
non-resident senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, both in
Washington, DC