The recent fall of Kabul reminds us of two things – different states react differently towards the new Taliban government and its shows the fragility of the Ashraf Ghani government, many regarding it as a mere proxy for Washington all these years.
In February 2020, the Trump administration entered into a deal with the Taliban leaders (known as the Doha Agreement), setting out a road map for an eventual US military withdrawal.
Trump had always viewed the war in Afghanistan as a "complete waste" and had promised during his presidency campaign in 2016 to bring home US troops. His successor, Joe Biden, kept that presidential promise.
Soon after Kabul fell, Britain's Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, urged the international community "to exercise caution" in recognising a Taliban government. News report however stated that by Aug 20, 2021, both China and Russia had effectively conferred de facto recognition on the Taliban government.
The international law of recognition has two dimensions – the recognition of states and the recognition of governments. The former is governed by 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which prescribes the criteria of statehood as follows:
It must have a permanent population; It has a defined territory; It has a government; and it has the capacity to enter into relations with other States.
Afghanistan became a free and independent state after the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919, eventually becoming the Kingdom of Afghanistan in June 1926. It had certainly met the Montevideo Convention criteria for the purposes of international law.
The virtual G7 summit on Aug 24, hosted by the United Kingdom had formulated the future road for Afghanistan under the Taliban government. The first option is withholding recognition until the current military airlift is completed. A second option is requiring the Taliban government to commit itself to a set of human rights standards (especially of women and children).
The earlier Taliban government under Burhanuddin Rabbani (called "The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan") came into power in September 1996. It was recognised only by three states (Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) and lasted until 2001 when it was toppled by a US-led military coalition.
The US invasion took place after the Sept 11 attacks in New York, which led the White House to launch its "war on terror".
In that 2020 Doha Agreement, despite insisting that it did not recognise the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, nevertheless, Washington entered into a formal agreement with the Taliban leaders.
Non-recognition does not mean non-engagement. China had always engaged openly with the Taliban leaders, even during the period when the Taliban forces were fighting the Ghani government and the Afghan national army.
On July 28, long before the Taliban seized power in Kabul, the Chinese government had hosted talks with Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baddar when the latter visited Tanjin, China. In a similar fashion, the Russian embassy in Kabul had always been open, and Russia had always been engaging the Taliban.
On Sept 2, India stated that it had yet to decide on recognising the Taliban government. On Sept 3, British foreign secretary Dominic Raab told the media that United Kingdom would not recognise the new Taliban government.
Emphasising that "Britain normally recognises states rather than governments", Raab acknowledged that "we don't recognise, but we engage the Taliban government". He admitted that it would not have been possible to bring 15,000 people out from Kabul without their cooperation.
On Sept 4, Denmark's Foreign Ministry stated that it would not recognise the Taliban government.
The question for Malaysia is "Do we recognise or isolate the Taliban government?" We take note that the new Taliban government had promised it would not go back to the old ways.
But will it also take the next several steps – form an inclusive government (perhaps a "theocratic democracy"), hold early elections, establish democratic institutions, protect women and minority groups, grant amnesty (promise no retribution) to its old enemies?
Isolating the Taliban government may do more harm than good. It can create, and perpetuate, an environment in which militant groups will thrive. We owe the people of Afghanistan a better life than before.
The writer was a federal counsel at the Attorney-General's Chambers and visiting professor at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. He is now a full-time consultant, trainer and author