LETTERS: The recent hypersonic missile test by North Korea, the second such test in a week, has caused reverberations across the region and beyond.
The United States has again come out strongly opposing such tests to be a destabilising mistake by the North Koreans. Japan and South Korea have voiced similar sentiments.
The US certainly has its hands full at the turn of the new year, having to juggle with rapidly evolving security concerns across different regions.
With potential Russian aggression and invasion of Ukraine to the surprise uprising and security fall-out in Kazakhstan and the risk of Russia's next strategic manoeuvre in the country, the US has again banked on the avenue of diplomacy as the ultimate resort in easing tensions with imposing sanctions seen as the highest punitive action to be taken.
The end results have not always been encouraging as can be seen in the Ukraine crisis and the continuing North Korean saga.
The Kim Jong-un regime has realised the staggering importance of keeping its nuclear capacity as the single-most crucial deterring factor and in keeping its legitimacy and power projection alive and well, at least in getting the big powers to come to its terms in negotiations and conflict resolution.
The regime has successfully enabled then president Trump to meet personally amidst the growing nuclear threat and with little success to show from the series of meetings and with worsening economic and food security climate from sanctions and the pandemic, Kim once again has to resort to a stronger carrot-and-stick approach.
In his address to the nation in marking his first decade in power, Kim has highlighted the importance of improving food security in light of the deteriorating grim situation of food availability, made worse by the pandemic and the sanctions.
Pressured by the need to ensure a no repeat of the great famine suffered in the mid-1990s and the need to exert more bargaining power with the US and other affiliated parties in easing the sanctions, Kim again resorted to this proven measure to force the powers to undertake greater responsibilities and to do their part in seeking the best terms forward.
While debatable and arguable among the experts and analysts on the claim by North Korea of the nature and success of the tests, they have upped the ante with the higher stakes involved, now that the US has continued to face growing capacities and capabilities of this technology from China and North Korea, apart from conventional rivalry with Russia.
The latest test is seen as having much improved speed and precision, reaching Mach 10 or 10 times the speed of sound, as well as boasting greater manoeuvrability of the hypersonic glide combat unit with possible capacity with the Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV).
It can, in theory, fly as fast as 20 times the speed of sound and can be very manoeuvrable in its course of flying, further adding strains to the missile defence system, making key target areas extremely vulnerable to the impact and destructions from the missiles.
The next frontier in warfare is pillared by the command and expertise in the missile technology, particularly of hypersonic capacity.
With China seemingly presenting a surprise to US defence and strategic analysts with the successful test launch of its hypersonic missile capability last August, the US has found itself in a situation where it has to double efforts in maintaining supremacy in the field and playing catching up in some areas.
Hypersonic missiles are specifically dangerous for their capabilities in evading radar longer than conventional missiles and also the exceptional speed and manoeuvrability they possess make it harder and even sometimes impossible for anti-missile system to properly work to track and intercept.
It is not hard to fathom the growing uneasiness and worries of the US and its allies in the escalating hypersonic capabilities of China and North Korea in warranting an enhanced integration of their reactive actions in stemming the tide and upping their own capacities.
While diplomacy and dialogue continue to be banked on, the implications of a more complex security spectrum will always persist for as long as the three main flashpoints of Taiwan, South China Sea and the North Korean debacles linger on, and there is no indicator in the near term that the prospects are encouraging.
The year ahead will see growing threats of high intensity fallouts and increased incursions and military threats evolving in the three flashpoints.
Unless determined, strong diplomacy and goodwill are shown, with the prevalence of confidence building measures and frank and transparent dialogue avenues where respect for norms and sanctity of the international law and treaties are mutually adhered to.
COLLINS CHONG
Universiti Malaya
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the New Straits Times