MARITIME disputes between states and international stakeholders in the region are not always about the ownership of territories. The disputes can be over access to the maritime space, including access through sea lanes of communications for international commerce.
For example, some coastal states have disputed the right and freedom of others to use part of the sea under their jurisdiction without permission. There are stakeholders who have expressed an unfounded fear that China could interdict international trade through the South China Sea in peace time. States compete to protect sea resources. Indonesia and Malaysia are concerned about illegal fishing in their exclusive economic zones.
Since 1999, China has imposed restrictions for fishing in the South China Sea between May and August each year for conservation and sustainability purposes. These policies have not gone unchallenged and have created their security dynamics.
The disputes also revolve around the interpretation of law. For example, many states in the region do not share the United States’ definition of “excessive maritime claims”. They have disputed the US unilateral assertions under the “Freedom of Navigation” (FON) programme against what Washington labels as excessive maritime claims.
The US makes no bones about the real purpose of its FON programme in the South China Sea, that is, to prevent the “emergence of a regional hegemon” (read: China). While US uses law of the sea as the basis for determining excessive maritime claims, it does not recognise the division of the ocean space beyond the territorial sea and the continental shelf.
Under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, the ocean space is divided into internal sea, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and high sea. Washington divides the ocean space into national waters and international waters. This disagreement has created enforcement problems for many coastal states with US vessels.
Many of the territorial disputes in Asia-Pacific are the legacy of colonial history. For example, the disputes over the Northern Territories/Kuril between Russia and Japan could be traced to the aftermath of World War 2.
It was the victorious powers that decided on the surrender terms for Japan. These islands were surrendered to Russia
under the Yalta Agreement (February 1945), the Potsdam Declaration (July 1945) and the Treaty of San Francisco (September 1951).
Similarly, the dispute between Japan, China and Taiwan over the ownership of Senkaku/ Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai Islands has its roots in history. Claiming that the islands were originally theirs, China is incensed by Japan’s administrative control of the islands since 1972, courtesy of the US. Japan claimed that China ceded the islands under the Treaty of Shimonoseki after the Qing dynasty lost the war in 1895. China accused Japan of forcefully annexing the territories when it was weak.
In 2013, China established an air defence identification zone over the East China Sea, including the airspace over the disputed islands. In November 2014, Tokyo and Beijing reached a four-point agreement calling for the development of a “strategic relationship of mutual benefit” and the establishment of a crisis-management mechanism between the two countries. However, due to intervening domestic and international factors, the effort has not produced any positive result. Both parties remain suspicious of each other’s motives.
Tokyo viewed Beijing’s militarisation of features in the South China Sea and the construction of artificial islands as a threatening trend that does not bode well for its security in the East China Sea. Beijing, on the other hand, is wary that Tokyo is not keen to settle the bilateral dispute amicably, so long as the US-Japan Security Treaty remains intact. Article V of the treaty mandates the US to come to Japan’s defence if any of its territories, including the disputed Senkaku, is under attack. However, in an unlikely situation of China crossing the red line over the Senkaku, no Japanese, in my view, will commit harakiri or seppuku, if the US fails to honour the treaty.
The writer is a student of regional geopolitics, defence policy and commentator on maritime security