THE lead-up to the much-anticipated Asean-United States special summit did not have the best of starts.
Conflicting schedules saw the summit being postponed in March, before being finally locked in on May 12 and 13.
Not all Asean members will be there. Myanmar has been excluded by mutual agreement, and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte opted to skip it to avoid committing to decisions that might bind his successor.
The general sense is that missteps by both sides contributed to the delay. From Asean, there were overlapping and conflicting roles played by Cambodia (the current chair) and Indonesia (coordinator for the US).
However, more than a few Asean members felt that the lack of nuance in the initial planning from Washington did not help matters either.
The Asean-US relationship is an important one, with 2022 marking the 45th anniversary of engagements, currently framed as a strategic partnership.
The US is Asean's second-largest trading partner, with foreign direct investments touching US$338 billion in recent years, more than one third of America's total investment in the Indo-Pacific region.
Four issues bear consideration in the lead-up to the special summit.
First, stakeholders in Washington DC ought to be mindful that engagement with Asean should not be overtly predicated on strategic rivalries with other major powers — namely China, and now Russia.
It would be unrealistic not to expect at least some of this rhetoric coming from the US. But it should not be the crux of discussions.
Most member states' positions on China and Russia are unlikely to change, even if there are disputes or reservations. An appreciation of national interests works both ways.
This broader point has been repeated by many Southeast Asians for many years.
The fact that it is a recurrent theme is a damning if not disappointing indictment; despite constant narratives from Washington about maintaining an "enduring commitment" to Southeast Asia, policymakers there still fail to understand or fully appreciate the region's concerns and geostrategic realities.
Second, the abovementioned point is an important lens through which the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) will be seen by Asean stakeholders.
The broad emphasis of IPEF has been announced — four pillars centred on fair trade; supply chain resiliency; infrastructure, clean energy and decarbonisation; and good governance. President Joe Biden will unveil further details at the special summit. It would be easier for Asean to get behind IPEF if it were truly open and inclusive. Meaning, all member states are engaged and it doesn't explicitly exclude China's participation.
Also important is the need for signals emphasising the continuity and durability of IPEF as part of long-term US engagement with the region.
Third, it is important to elevate the Asean-US relationship to that of a comprehensive strategic partnership. The symbolism is important. Asean already has such levels of partnership with China and Australia.
The US is well positioned to make it a trio, which will be welcomed by most member states as Asean seeks equilibrium in relationships with major powers.
The Asean-United States Strategic Partnership (2021-2025) plan of action provides the economic, political-security and socio-cultural initiatives to upgrade the relationship.
Initiatives from the US announced in October 2021 focusing on healthcare, climate action and sustainable development are important building blocks. Policymakers from Asean and the US should work towards committing to this elevation by 2025 at the latest.
Last, it isn't a deterioration of the Asean-US relationship that is the real concern here, but rather the risk of stagnation or the lack of progress.
And there are signs that the relationship is not moving as well as it can. Southeast Asia and the US ought to keep in mind that "more of the same" or "good enough" is not a yardstick either party should aspire to.
It might be a bit late in the game now, but as policymakers and their advisers go into the summit, the long-term costs that it can inflict on the multilateral relationship are well worth considering.
This is why tangible and demonstrable progress is essential for Asean and the US.
The writer is senior fellow, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.