US-CHINA, US-China — the commentary goes on and on. Who will be dominant? Must rising powers always go to war with established powers? Can the United States assemble an Indo-Pacific alliance to balance China?
All urgent questions — but some recent Asian perspectives (including from a Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific survey, asialink.unimelb.
edu.au/stories/surveying-regional-perspectives-on-covid-19) suggest growing impatience.
There is talk of reinvigorating multilateralism — with the suggestion that the much-maligned Asean might be best able to lead a multilateralism that transcends what a Japanese analyst calls these "bilateral dynamics".
The performance of both China and America has disappointed.
But Tsutomu Kikuchi reminds us that Asia is "more than the US and China", and that numerous countries and institutions in "the rest of Asia" have "substantial political, economic, military and sociocultural power".
Their goal, he says, should be "to sustain and further enhance the rules-based order" because smaller states tend to be protected by "strong binding rules."
Looking beyond US-China, who could lead a multilateral endeavour? Interestingly, Kikuchi notes the continuing capacities of Asean.
Like other multilateral institutions, it has received plenty of criticism during the Covid-19 crisis. But the pandemic has demonstrated the real need for international cooperation — and some even hope that Asean will undergo an ambitious "reset".
Reviewing Asean credentials is justified, especially as there are no other obvious candidates likely to build a consensual regional order.
Asean-led institutions do, after all, encompass the entire Asia-Pacific region. The East Asia Summit includes every serious player in the region as do the security forums — the Asean Regional Forum and Asean Defence Minister's Meeting Plus.
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which seeks to promote open trade and investment, was launched in 2012, again by Asean, and incorporates every country in Southeast and Northeast Asia, as well as Australia and New Zealand.
The point is often made that Asean is no match for China. This would be hard to deny (including in the South China Sea). But Asean does have economic prowess — even becoming China's largest trading partner in 2020.
Also, as former Malaysian prime minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad often pointed out, Southeast Asians are used to negotiating with a powerful China — and they believe that China is invested in their region for the long haul. There is pride in the way Southeast Asia embraced Communist China, commencing in the 1970s.
The initiating of the Asian-centric Asean Plus Three process in 1997, after decades of US presence and support of the economies of Southeast Asia, highlights Asean's agency in engaging a multiplicity of players. As leading Thai analyst Kavi Chongkittavorn has pointed out, the Plus Three element was also an Asean contribution to bridge building between the large, mutually hostile states of Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea).
Initiatives by Asean, including greater engagement with Japan and South Korea, would not be interpreted automatically in the framework of US-China rivalry. There have been various reports of improved relations between China and its Northeast Asian neighbours — and Kavi insists that although "historical grievances and border disputes will not disappear overnight", the Covid-19 crisis has provided an opportunity to benefit from "shared anxieties and worries".
Such a shift in sentiment could be a game changer across the Asian region.
More relaxed interstate relations in Northeast Asia — fostered, in part, by Asean — would certainly be a more favourable setting for Asean-led, rules-based regional building.
The fact that Southeast Asian states are small in Asian terms helps Asean appear non-threatening; also, over many centuries, Southeast Asians have become accustomed to functioning in state-to-state hierarchies, developing strategies to handle those above them.
Even a state growing in strength was not necessarily seen as a threat — and thus resisted or balanced against. Such a state might rather be embraced or socialised — in a manner beneficial to both sides. Historically, this was the approach to China.
With such a heritage, valuing agency while operating in a hierarchy, Asean may have more qualifications than most in "the rest of Asia" to promote a multilateral rule-structure — a structure that will not immediately be viewed as antagonistic to China, but may help to restrain China or any other major power capable of disrupting this region of the world.
What is needed now from Asean states is the creative leadership they have on occasion demonstrated in the past.
Anthony Milner is International Director, Asialink (University of Melbourne). Datuk Astanah Abdul Aziz is from the Foreign Ministry, Malaysia. This article reflects her personal views and is not a statement of the Malaysian government's position